I am not my self: Reconceiving identity in rehabilitation care.
Lily Gryspeerdt
PMID 41615850WHAT IT FOUND
This paper offers a philosophical argument rather than clinical evidence.
It suggests therapists view identity as a dynamic social interaction rather than a fixed internal 'self', but reports no patient outcomes or trial data.
What this paper is
This is a philosophical essay proposing a Wittgensteinian view of identity in rehabilitation, arguing against the concept of a separable 'self'. It contains no original empirical data, clinical trials, or patient outcomes, so there are no findings to act on.
Declared interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest and received no financial support.
The easy way to misread this
Do not treat the author's philosophical argument for re-conceptualising identity as an evidence-based clinical intervention or a validated therapeutic framework.
Summarised by AI from the full paper, without a clinician reviewing it. Check it against the source before it changes what you do. Read it on PubMed →